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Abstract 
This paper deals with decision making on government debt in an overlapping-genera- 
tions model of a small open economy. The government is concerned with the utility of 
current generations only, but it explicitly takes the effect of current decisions on future 
government decisions into account. Fiscal policy is constrained by viability conditions. An 
analytical solution for the time paths of debt and taxes is derived. Decreasing as well as 
increasing debt levels can be obtained. Conditions are given determining which of these 
patterns prevails. Finally, the effects of (anticipated and unanticipated) shocks in the 
exogenous parameters on the time path of government debt are analyzed. 
JEL classification: D78; H30; H63 
Keywords: Government debt; Dynamics; Overlapping generations 
1. Introduction 
In many western countries a similar evolution of  government debt occurred 
after World  War  II. First, debt ratios declined, until, somewhere in the mid 
seventies, they started to rise. Recently, the EC countries have proclaimed by way 
of  the treaty of  Maastricht that stabilization of  debt ratios (at a relatively low 
value) is the policy goal to be targeted. These phenomena raise the question as to 
the determining factors of  the evolution of  debt. One obvious candidate for 
explaining this evolution is the interest rate. But the age structure of  the population 
may also constitute an important factor. The effect of  the age structure depends to 
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a large extent on the ruling tax regime. In the overlapping-generations model, to 
be developed in Section 2, all consumers, both young and old, pay a consumption 
tax at the same rate. For the elderly, tax shifting by debt creation would then be 
advantageous. For the young, however, tax shifting may imply that they are 
confronted with part of  the burden of  the additional debt when they are old. Due to 
this way of  modelling a built-in restriction on debt creation exists. In such a 
model, aging, i.e. an increase in the number of  elderly relative to the number of  
young, has two effects. The political influence of the elderly, who prefer tax 
shifting, increases. On the other hand, a decrease in population growth leads to an 
increase in the interest rate corrected for population growth, which decreases the 
tax base. This implies that the possibilities for tax shifting decrease in the long 
run. As a consequence, the current young may be confronted with a higher future 
tax burden if taxes are shifted now. Therefore, they will be more strongly opposed 
to tax shifting. 
From this perspective, this paper analyzes the choice of  the debt policy of a 
rational government. It is assumed that the government only takes the utility of  
current generations into account. So, it may be interpreted as a representative 
government which consists of  subsequent generations of  politicians with a finite 
time horizon. There is no way a present politician is able to bind his successors to 
a planned policy. This does not imply that future policy is exogenously given to a 
present politician: government debt is the instrument through which he is able to 
influence future decisions. Therefore, rational expectations of  future decisions 
have to be formed. In particular, generations of  politicians are assumed to be able 
to calculate all possible paths of  future taxes (and, hence, debt levels) as a function 
of  the present tax rate and to pick the path that maximizes their welfare, i.e. they 
are assumed to be Stackelberg leaders towards future generations of  politicians. 
The assumption of  Stackelberg leadership has been introduced before in this 
context. Persson and Svensson (1989) and Tabellini and Alesina (1990) use 
Stackelberg behavior in a two-period model. Alesina and Tabellini (1990) do 
consider an infinite-horizon model but confine themselves to a steady-state 
analysis. In these papers, debt is used to force future governments with different 
policy preferences to pursue the policy preferred by the present government. Note 
that in these models there is no overlapping-generations structure. As a result, 
there is no inherent tendency to shift taxes to future periods as these future taxes 
have to be paid by the decision makers themselves. 
In the present paper, the possibility of  tax shifting is at the heart of  the analysis. 
Like the literature cited above, repudiation 1 is abstracted from. Contrary to this 
i Tabellini (1991) studies debt as an instrument of intergenerational redistribution in a two-period 
model that allows for repudiation. Altruism is essential for his results. Without altruism the government 
budget is always in balance. Other papers dealing with intergenerational redistribution in a political- 
economic model with altruism include Cukierman and Meltzer (1989) and Hansson and Stuart (1989). 
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work, successive generations of policymakers are assumed to have identical 
preferences. Moreover, an infinite-time horizon is considered. The present paper 
also abstracts from altruism. Assuming that the policy adopted reflects the interests 
of the different groups present in that period, an explicit solution for the time path 
of government debt and the tax rate is derived. It appears that government debt can 
decrease or increase in the course of time. In the latter case, it asymptotically 
approaches a finite maximum sustainable value. 
It can be shown that the time path chosen by representative governments may, 
but need not, coincide with the one that results in the case of a social-welfare-max- 
imizing government. In the literature cited above, normative and positive solutions 
always coincide if differences in preferences are absent. This is due to the fact 
that, as noted above, in these models, tax shifting is irrelevant if preferences are 
the same over time. 2 It should be noted that, according to the present model, in 
contrast with the infinite-horizon model in Alesina and Tabellini (1990), a 
welfare-maximizing government does not necessarily choose a balanced-budget 
policy. Depending on the social rate of time preference and the interest rate, the 
government will choose increasing or decreasing debt levels. 
The ability to calculate time paths for the debt also makes it possible to analyze 
how the course of these paths will change due to exogenous changes in the 
parameters. As shown in Section 4, these changes lead to jumps in the level of 
debt at the time the change becomes known. Moreover, it may change the 
maximum sustainable debt level. 
2. The model 
In the sequel, a small open economy will be assumed where debtors are able to 
borrow from domestic lenders as well as foreign lenders, both against a fixed 
world interest rate. In this case, the capacity of the domestic capital market does 
not impose any restrictions on the borrowing behavior of the government. This in 
contrast with a closed economy, where government borrowing is restricted by the 
capacity of the domestic capital market. 
2.1. The consumers  
A standard overlapping-generations model is used where two non-altruistic 
generations, old and young, are present at the same time. Each individual lives for 
two periods. In the first period, he is endowed with one unit of income of which 
2 In Tabellini (1991) only the young pay taxes. So, debt creation implies complete shifting of the 
tax burden. In that case, debt creation is only restricted by the threat of repudiation. 
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he saves an amount s. He has to pay a tax rate "r over the remaining part. The rest 
is used for consumption in the first period of his life, ct y, which therefore equals: 
c y = (1 - zt)(1 - s t ) .  (1) 
When he is old, the savings including the interest revenues net of  taxes are 
consumed: 
c;+, =(1-  +r)s, (2) 
where c~'÷t is old-age consumption at time t + 1 and r is the given fixed world 
interest rate. So, at a given time the young and the elderly pay the same tax rate 
which excludes direct transfers from the current young to the current elderly. As 
noted in the Introduction, this implies that for the young forbearance of taxation 
may not be acquittance. Note that the tax system used is actually a consumption 
tax instead of an income tax. s t can be seen as savings for future consumption so 
that these can be considered as pension premiums which are tax deductible in 
many countries. The value of savings, including accrued interest, then equals the 
pension benefit which is taxable. The young optimize a lifetime-utility function 
U~ = U(c  y, c°+ 1) subject to Eqs. (1) and (2). The instrument in the optimization is 
the savings rate. Hence, the first-order condition reads 
ou, 
= - c~c---~- (1 - zt) + 0cO+~-T(1 + r ) (1  - r t+ , )  = 0 .  (3)  0s--'- 7
From this follows st* = st* ('r t, ~t+ J, r)  as the optimal amount of  savings. 
2.2. The government  
Government outlays at time t consist of  interest payments on the given amount 
of  government debt per consumer of generation t - 1, b t j, and given expendi- 
tures per consumer of generation t, gt. The government generates revenues by 
levying taxes. Abstracting from the possibility of  debt repudiation, directly or 
indirectly through monetary finance, the government 's  budget identity reads (l+r) 
b t=  l W n  b, l + g t - i t  (4) 
where n is the growth rate of the population and T t is total tax revenue per 
consumer of generation t. From Eqs. (1) and (2) it follows that total tax revenue 
equals 
l t = T  , ( l - s , ) +  - ~ n  ]S,_ t . (5) 
Two natural conditions constrain the set of fiscal policies open to the govern- 
ment. Firstly, the government is forced by the foreign and domestic lenders to 
obey the well-known No-Ponzi-Game condition which simply says that the 
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principal and the service of the debt cannot be financed completely by going into 
new debt. In other words, it requires that the present value of outstanding debt 
converges towards 0 asymptotically, i.e., 
(i+rt l i rn ~ ]  b~=0 .  (6) 
Aggregating forward Eq. (4) from period t on to a final period T, the 
government's intertemporal budget constraint results: 
(m÷r/'' (,÷ri'J 
b t = ~ l + n ]  b,+ ~ ( T j - g j ) .  (7) 
j=t+l~ l + n  ] 
The NPG condition then implies that the intertemporal budget constraint for an 
infinite horizon can be written as 
b, =j=t~+ 1 (Tj - gj) (8) 
which is the well-known result that the present debt has to be met by future 
primary surpluses. This condition is tightened by a second natural constraint. 
When raising taxes, the government faces a maximum tax rate, "r max, which, 
obviously, never exceeds 1. This implies that the total of future primary surpluses 
is finite (assuming that the tax base grows at a rate smaller than (1 + r ) / ( l  + n)) 
and thus constitutes a threshold value, b ma×, above which the (foreign) lenders will 
no longer be willing to buy government debt since then they know for sure that it 
will not be repaid. 
The threshold value b max and the maximum tax rate rmax constrain the set of 
fiscal policies open to the government. Which policy will be chosen by the 
government from this set depends on the decision making process. The govern- 
ment at time t represents currently living generations only and is succeeded by 
another government every next period. It is assumed to maximize a decision 
function: 3 
W, = W(Ut_ l , (1 + n)Ut). (9) 
Every t, this decision function is maximized again by a new generation of 
politicians. In choosing its policy the government explicitly takes account of s,*, 
the optimal amount of savings chosen by the consumers. This makes it act as a 
Stackelberg leader towards the private sector. 
Given the fact that current generations are not altruistic towards future genera- 
tions, the current government does not take the utility of future generations into 
3 Bernheim (1989) calls a decision function as in Eq. (9) "... within an overlapping generations 
framework . . . .  the most natural class of welfare functions for a representative government" (p. 124). 
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account. Therefore, the scope for fiscal policy for an incumbent government is 
confined to the present period. The chosen policy has, however, implications for 
the actions to be taken by future governments. It is assumed that the current 
government takes these actions into account in choosing a policy. This means that 
it also acts as a Stackelberg leader towards all future governments. 
3. The evolution of debt 
This section focuses on the decision making process when W, in Eq. (9) is 
maximized again each period. Only the current young and old generation count in 
the decision making process. The fiscal policy preferred may depend on an agent's 
planning horizon. Even when their preferences can be characterized by the same 
utility function, conflicts of interest between agents may arise if they have 
different planning horizons. In particular, while the elderly would prefer complete 
tax shifting, the young may, due to the age-independent tax structure, be interested 
in policies that smooth taxes over their lifetime. The tax rate set by the govern- 
ment follows from the maximization of Eq. (9). Assuming an interior solution, the 
first-order condition reads 
O W  t O W  t ~Ut_  I (~W t 
3T-~-= 3Ut_-----~l Oct [ - ( 1  +r)st*_,] + - ~ t ( 1  + n )  
× -Oc---'-~t ( 1 - s , * ) + ( 1 - T , )  
OUt [ ( l _ 7 t + l ) ( l + r )  OSt* * 0Tt+l ] /  +c~c'~+-~-i --~Tt-(l+r)st---~-vt ] ] = 0 (10) 
where %+ j is the tax rate set by the next period government. Note that Tt+ 1 is a 
function of r t reflecting the fact that an incumbent government acts as a 
Stackelberg leader towards future governments. 4 In Eq. (10), the terms 0Wt/OU t_ l 
and OWt/OU t can be interpreted as the marginal political power of an old and a 
young individual respectively. The political preferences of the old and the young 
generation then follow from Eq. (10) by setting OWt/OU t and OWt/aUt_ l 
respectively equal to 0. From OWt/OUt=O, assuming positive savings and 
,9Ut_l/OC t > 0 it follows that c)WJO7 t < 0, implying that there is no internal 
solution. This clearly indicates the preference for low taxes by the present elderly. 
Since they will have passed away the next period and do not bother about the 
utility of the present young generation or any other future generation, they will 
4 Since the next government  is assumed to be a Stackelberg leader to its successors, "rt+ 1 implicit ly 
takes "rt~ 2 , - . . , ' r*  into account. 
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prefer tax rates to be set at the lowest possible level which is determined by the 
maximum debt level, b max. The political preferences of the young follow by 
setting OWr/OU t_ 1 equal to 0 in Eq. (10). In this case substituting Eq. (3) in Eq. 
(10) and rewriting gives 
0Tt ;  1 ( 1 -  T t ; 1 ) ( 1 - - S ; )  
(11) 
0",', (1 - r , )  s,* 
The left-hand side of Eq. (11) is associated with the marginal costs of a 
one-dollar tax decrease. The right-hand side gives the willingness to substitute 
present taxes for future taxes. According to Eq. (11), the tax policy preferred by 
the young is the one where marginal cost equals marginal willingness. 5 Note that 
since neither negative savings rates nor tax rates or savings rates larger than 1 are 
allowed, for any t it will hold that O'rt~+ 1//0Tt _~ 0. The consequence of this is that 
if the political power of the young is non-negligible, the government is urged to 
trade-off current and future tax rates, given the Stackelberg assumption that it 
takes account of the relation between the current and all future tax rates. A lower 
current tax rate will lead to a higher debt inherited by the next generation which, 
as a result, might have to opt for a higher tax rate. 6 For old individuals the 
trade-off between current and future taxes is of no relevance. As noted before, if 
the elderly are solely decisive for the tax rate, then the tax rate will be set at its 
lowest possible value given the viability of the implied policy. The tax rate 
actually chosen in the political process will result from weighing the preferences 
of the old and the young generations. 
Assume the utility function to be of a logarithmic type, i.e.,U t = ln(ct y) + 
01n(ct+ ~), where 0 is the private discount factor. Furthermore, it is assumed that 
government expenditures g are constant and smaller than 1 7 and that T max equals 
1. Given these assumptions, it immediately follows from Eq. (3) that the young 
choose st*= 0 /1  + 0 for all t. Moreover, to derive an explicit solution, the 
5 An alternative interpretation of Eq. (11) is as follows: A young individual has two ways of 
influencing his second-period consumption possibilities; either directly by changing his savings s or 
indirectly by choosing a higher (lower) current tax rate in return for a lower (higher) tax rate in the next 
period. The latter can be seen as 'saving through the government'. Now, Eq. (11) can be interpreted as 
an arbitrage condition which denotes when the young consumer is indifferent between these two forms 
of saving. This can be seen by rewriting Eq. (11) as 
-[&r'+l/&r'](l+r)st* 1 -  ~"*~ 1 (1 
l - -ST 1---~t" + r ) ,  
where the right-hand side is the rate of return of private savings and the left-hand side denotes the rate 
of return of 'saving through the government'. 
6 This is, however, not necessary. The tax rise may be postponed until period t + 2 or later, leaving 
%+ 1 unaffected. In that case, the interests of the young and elderly coincide. 
7 g < 1 implies that the level of government expenditures per consumer is lower than the initial 
endowment each consumer receives in the economy. 
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marginal political power of  the individual members of  the two generations is 
assumed to be constant and normalized so that O W t / O U  t_ i = 1 and O W J O U  t = A 
where 0 < h < ~. Inserting all this in Eq. (10) results in the following first-order 
condition for the government at time t: 
1 - r,+j A(I + n ) {  1 - ~'t+~ Or'+~ } = 0  (12) 
° o ( 1 -  7,) z + 
for t = 1 . . . . .  ~. Notice in Eq. (12) that, as expected, the relation between the 
current and future tax rate is of  importance only if a young individual has some 
political power, i.e., h > 0. The term between brackets reflects Eq. (11), the 
marginal trade-off made by the young. However, the government also takes the 
preferences of  the elderly, which are reflected in the first term, into account. 
Hence, it follows that the tax rate chosen by the government will be lower (or at 
most equal to) the tax rate preferred by the young. In the extreme case where 
h = 0, Eq. (12) cannot hold with equality implying that there is no internal 
solution. Given b max, the lowest possible tax rate results. 
At any time t, the government, as a Stackelberg leader towards future govern- 
ments, knows that future governments use Eq. (12) to solve for the tax rate. 
Therefore, it uses this equation to calculate the relation between its own and future 
government decisions. 
To derive a solution for the infinite horizon problem the following procedure is 
used: first the finite horizon problem is solved and then a solution for the infinite 
horizon problem is derived as the limit of  the finite horizon problem. 8 Assume the 
time horizon to be finite, "r. Obedience of  the No-Ponzi-Game condition for a 
finite T implies that all government debt has to be repaid, i.e., 9 
b =O. (13) 
The calculation executed by the forward-looking government at time t goes 
backward starting in the final period r. In that period, the government has no 
choice but to obey the terminal condition b~ = 0. The tax rate in the final period, 
then, follows immediately from the government 's budget constraint, Eq. (4): 
1 + 0  
r ~ * -  1 + ( I + P ) 0  [ ( l + P ) b ~ - I  + g ]  (14) 
where P =  ( r - n ) / ( 1  + n), P denotes the effective interest rate, and, hence, 
1 + ? = (1 + r ) / (1  + n). In period "r - 1, the incumbent government explicitly 
8 Note that standard dynamic programming techniques are not applicable in this case because of the 
form of the target function. 
9 Strictly speaking, the No-Ponzi-Game condition for a finite horizon reads lim t ~ 7[(1 + r)/(1 + 
n)]tbt = 0. But since [(I + r)/(1 + n)] t > 0 for every finitet this implies b r = O. 
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takes account of  Eq. (14). Inserting it in its own budget constraint and taking the 
derivative with respect to %_ 1 gives 
- - =  - ( 1  + 0 .  (15) 
&'~- 1 
Inserting Eqs. (14) and (15) into Eq. (12) and solving for "r r_ i learns that an 
interior solution will be obtained if: 
I + ( I + ? )  [ I + ( I + ? ) 0 ] [ ( I + ? ) + I ]  
br_2<__b max-- g +  
( l  + ?)2 (1 + 0 ) (1  + ?)2 
_ max If  b.r_ 2 - b T the tax rate will be equal to "r max. Moreover, bT_ 2 > b ma~ is simply 
not possible. The (foreign) lenders will prevent this level of  debt from being issued 
since it can never be repaid. Therefore, an interior solution is always obtained. 
Given %_ 1 thus obtained, the solution for the tax rate %_ 2, %-  3 and so on can be 
obtained in the same way. 
The solution for the infinite-horizon analogue of  the model follows by taking 
the limit of  the "r period model. 10 The solution for the tax rate at time t for the 
infinite-horizon model then reads: 
int if b, l ~<b  max 
r~t (16) 
L ' / ' m a x  if bt_ , = b max 
where 
( 1 + 0 ) ( 1 + ? )  fl 
ri~] = 1 - 1 + ( 1  + ? ) 0  1 + / 3  [b  . . . .  b ,_,]  (17) 
and 
g 1 + ( 1 + ? ) 0  
bmax - + 
? (1 + 0 ) ?  (18) 
where "r~"tt is the interior solution for the tax rate at time t. [3 is defined as 
[A(I + n ) +  0] / [A(1 + n)O] and describes the political compromise between the 
preferences of  the present generations. It reflects the political weight in the 
decision making process attached to present utility (of the old and young genera- 
tion) relative to future utility (of the present young). Of course, b max is indepen- 
dent of  the political influence of both generations as measured by h. Rewriting 
0 1 - g  
b max as 1 + 0 + ? , it becomes clear that, given the assumption g < 1, 
1o That the limit of the solution of the finite-horizon problem is indeed a solution for the 
infinite-horizon problem is easily seen by writing down the first-order conditions of the infinite-horizon 
model and checking the candidate solution and, furthermore, noting that the finite-horizon solution 
behaves as a turnpike (see e.g. Blanchard and Fischer, 1989), hence there are no transversality 
problems. 
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government debt exceeds savings which implies that the country is a debtor in the 
world capital market. ~1 
The evolution of debt can be traced by substituting solution (16) into the budget 
restriction (4). This gives the following linear difference equation: 
1 + ?  
( b  . . . .  bt) = 1 + /3  ( b  . . . .  b t _ l ) .  (19) 
b max-  b t ~ can be interpreted as the scope politicians in period t have for 
increasing the inherited debt. According to Eq. (19) this scope for policy-making 
changes from one period to another by the factor (1 + ? ) / (1  + /3) .  From this, it 
can be concluded that debt (and thus the tax rate) increases if ? < 13, decreases if 
P > [3 or remains unchanged if ? = 13. An intuition for this result can be given by 
noticing that Eq. (12) implies equality between the marginal political willingness 
to substitute taxes and the marginal cost of  tax substitution. The willingness in the 
political process to substitute present for future taxes is given by the first two 
terms in Eq. (12): 
O ~  / OWt _ 1 - ~ ' ~ , + t  
M R S¢ . ¢ .  .... - ~ 1 3 T ~ , + ,  1 - T~, 13 (20) 
From the definition of  13 it can be seen immediately that this willingness 
depends on both the private discount factor 0 and the political power balance 
h(1 + n). Lower values for 0 imply more impatience on the side of  the individual 
(young) consumers. They are more interested in present than in future consump- 
tion. This, obviously, lowers the political willingness to give up present consump- 
tion (and thus present utility) through highe r taxes now in exchange for future 
consumption. A similar argument holds for a lower h( l  + n), i.e. more political 
weight for the present elderly. Then again, the willingness to give up present 
consumption in exchange for future consumption is lower. On the other hand, the 
marginal cost of  tax shifting is given by 
MRT¢;,¢: ..... - O~'~t (1 + ?) 1 + /3  (21) 
I1 If, instead of an open economy, a closed economy with a linear production technology is assumed 
(i.e. f(k) = rk + w where w is normalized: w -= 1) the capital market imposes an additional constraint: 
b _< s = 0/(1 + 0). In that case, 
/ b maX=min 1+0 + ? ' 1+0 ' 
which implies that the constraint imposed by the tax base is redundant if g < 1. This implies a lower 
upperbound for government debt than in the open economy case, thus altering the set of feasible 
policies. However, in case of g > I, the results for the closed economy coincide with those of the small 
open economy. 
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Note that this marginal cost is lower than the marginal cost of a debt increase 
when debt has to be redeemed completely in the next period. In that case, the 
marginal cost of a one-dollar debt increase (or, equivalently, a one-dollar tax 
decrease) would be 1 + ? (see Eq. (15)). The reason for this is that, when debt is 
not completely redeemed in the next period, it is possible to shift the burden of the 
one-dollar debt increase partly over to future generations. This decreases the 
marginal costs. The degree to which this possibility is used depends on the private 
weight attached to future consumption (0) and the political power balance 
(k(1 + n)) as can be seen from [3. In the optimum the marginal costs of tax 
shifting have to equal the marginal benefits. From equalizing these two it follows 
that the tax rate (and, hence, debt) increases if ? < [3, decreases if ? > [3 or 
remains unchanged if ? = [3. 
The following proposition summarizes the results: 
Proposition l. I f  bo < b"~ax, k > O and O > O, for every finite t, it holds that: 
(a) I f  ~ < [3 then 
b t -  I < bt ,  
Toc,t - 1 < T~t" 
(b) I f  ? > [3 then 
b t -  1 > bt ,  
Toz~t-l > T~t . 
(c) I f  ? = [3 then 
bt- I = bt, 
Tzc~t_ 1 = T ~ , .  
The regimes (a) and (b) in the proposition correspond with the cases (a) and (b) 
in part (A) of Fig. 1 
Regime (c) corresponds with the case where the budget is balanced every 
period. The adjoining tax rate is then given by 
1 + 0  
r =  [ ? b + g ] .  
1 + ( 1 + ? ) 0  
Part (B) of Fig. 1 shows the evolution of the debt (Eq. (19)). Case (a) is the case 
? < [3 and the system converges towards the steady state b max through a sequence 
of increasing levels of debt. Case (b) for which ? > [3 results in an ever decreasing 
debt. 12 
12 Here, an unstable process occurs where the debt and the tax rate tend to minus infinity. In 
principle, negative debt also poses a problem of viability: in the case of foreign borrowers, the rest of 
the world must be wil l ing to serve it. It is possible to avoid such a process by imposing e.g. a 
non-negativity restriction on the tax rate. Then the debt wil l  converge to a finite min imum level. 
Calculations for this case have appeared in an earlier version of this paper and are available upon 
request. Since they do not provide additional insights they are left out here for exposit ional reasons. 
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Fig. 1. Possible debt-tax patterns (part A) and the evolution of debt (part B). 
It is interesting to compare the evolution of  the debt described in Proposition 1 
with the evolution that would result from the maximization of a social welfare 
function. It can easily be shown J3 that, if the government maximizes a Ben- 
thamite social welfare function with a social rate of  time preference p, a 
proposition analogous to Proposition 1 with 13 replaced by p can be derived. So, 
any evolution of  debt and taxes that can result from decision making by a 
representative government can also be found by maximizing a social welfare 
function that explicitly takes account of  the utility of  future generations. So, a 
representative democracy, where decision making is based on the utility of  the 
currently living generations only, may implicitly take account of  the welfare of  all 
13 See Meijdam et al. (1994). 
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future generations. However,  it will do this only to a l imited extent: since [3 > 1 
the implicit  social rate of  t ime preference can never be below 1. This result 
provides a justification for the common practice to mimic a positive government 
by a normative social welfare maximizing government with a high social rate of 
time preference compared to the individual rate of t ime preference (see e.g. van 
der Ploeg and van de Klundert, 1991). 
4. The effects of parameter changes 
The analysis in the previous section led to a description of  the evolution of  the 
debt as a function of  the exogenous parameters h, r, 0, g and n. This section 
analyzes how this evolution is affected by a change in these parameters. 14 Two 
cases have to be distinguished: one where the change in the parameters is 
unanticipated, the other where it is anticipated. In case of  an unanticipated change 
in the parameters these effects remain unknown until the time of the change, t = ?. 
If, however, the change is anticipated, the effects are taken into account from 
period 1 onwards as the news of  the change in the parametersarrives. 15 FromEq. 
(19) it follows that, given b t_ 1, a change in h, n, 0, r or g in period t has two 
effects: one running through b max, changing the scope for pol icy making, the other 
running through (1 + ? ) / ( 1  + / 3 ) ,  affecting the factor at which the scope for 
pol icy making is changing from one period to another. The following table 
summarizes the effects on b max and (1 + ? ) / ( 1  + / 3 ) :  
0h 00 Or 0g On 
0b max 0 q- -q- - q- 
0[(1 + ? ) / ( 1  + /3 )1  + + + 0 - 
.In the sequel, changes in the exogenous variables at some time}" will be 
investigated. The reference situation is ? < [~, i.e. increasing debt levels and tax 
rates. 
Effect o f  an increase in political power  o f  an old individual. This is reflected by 
a decrease in k at t ime 7. Since b max is independent of  political elements, this 
~4 Notice the difference with a comparative statics analysis where changes in the stationary state are 
analyzed. Here, changes in the whole time path of debt due to changes in the exogenous parameters are 
analyzed. 
~5 Note that, if the debt level at the time the news of the change arrives (either at t = 1 or at t = 7, 
the time of the change) is larger than the new b max a situation occurs where debt can never be repaid 
and the government is in fact bankrupt. 
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Fig. 2. 0k < 0. 
does  not  af fec t  the m a x i m u m  level  o f  debt .  Howeve r ,  this  m a x i m u m  sus ta inab le  
level  is a p p r o a c h e d  faster.  B e c a u s e  the m a i n  conce rn  o f  the e lder ly  is a low tax 
rate,  each  per iod  a la rger  par t  o f  the  scope  for  p o l i c y - m a k i n g  is c o n s u m e d .  The  
impl i ca t ions  o f  this  are r ep resen ted  in Fig. 2. 16 
16 In this figure and the figures to come, the dotted lines refer to the situation where there is no 
change in the respective exogenous parameter. The dashed line denotes the debt path followed in this 
case. The shift of the axis is due to a change in b max changing the scope for policy-making. Illustrated 
is the case where t '= 2. 
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In the case of an unanticipated decrease in h, debt jumps to a higher level at the 
time of the change, 7. Due to this jump, the old generation present at that time 
enjoys large gains from its increased political power. Subsequent generations of 
elderly can profit from their increased political power to a much lower degree, 
because they are left with a debt level much closer to the maximum level b max. 
Moreover, each generation reinforces this effect for their successors by consuming 
a larger part of their scope for policy-making. 
In case of an anticipated change in the political power of the elderly, the 
generations at t -- 1 will immediately exploit the possibility to jump to a higher 
debt level which arises due to the change in political power at 7. 17 Note that, 
because of this jump to a higher debt level and the chosen debt policy, all 
generations of elderly with increased political power, including the elderly of 
generation 7, are confronted with a smaller scope for policy-making. Hence, the 
gains from their increased political power are relatively low. 
Effect of an increase in the private discount factor. If the private discount factor 
0 increases, two opposing forces are at work as can be seen from the table above. 
Firstly, due to higher savings, the tax base enlarges making lower taxes and larger 
debt levels possible (i.e. b max increases, widening, ceteris paribus, the scope for 
policy-making). Secondly, the relative political weight of present utility decreases 
(i.e. [3 decreases) implying, ceteris paribus, a preference for higher taxes now 
relative to future taxes. As a result, less debt is passed on to the future thus 
increasing the scope for policy-making for future generations of politicians. 
Fig. 3 provides an illustration of an unanticipated and an anticipated change. In 
case of an unanticipated increase in 0, the two opposing effects are at work at the 
same time 7. Therefore, the total effect is ambiguous and depends on the 
magnitude of the increase. ~8 For small alterations in 0 the tax-base effect 
dominates, for larger alterations in 0 the political weight effect dominates which 
even might lead to a regime switch from increasing debt levels to decreasing debt 
levels. The upper part of Fig. 3 illustrates a jump to a lower level bz. Savings 
increase, making more debt creation possible. However, politicians are not in- 
clined to do so, due to the higher political weight attached to future utility. If there 
is an anticipated change, the generations before time 7 can and will take advantage 
of the enlargement of b max due to the increase in 0 at time 7. Hence, at t = 1 there 
is a jump to a higher level of debt. At time 7, only the increased political weight of 
the future is left, implying a slower growth of the debt. Note that the generations 
L7 The generations between t = 1 and t = 7 then pursue debt policies that would be unsustainable if 
they were continued after 7. This can easily be seen from Fig. 2 by extending the solid line of policies 
between 0 and 7 -  1. It will  not pass through the origin. However,  because of the change in political 
power at 7, a switch is made towards a sustainable policy. 
18 Note that, if  ? > 13, the political weight  effect always dominates and a jump at t ime 7 to a lower 
level of government  debt can be observed. 
82 L. M e i j d a m  et  al. / E u r o p e a n  Journa l  o f  Pol i t ica l  E c o n o m y  12 (1996)  6 7 - 9 0  
m a x  I . m a x  b bt> i - bt ut< ~ -- t 
b ' '°~ b ' t < ~  - -  ~ , - 1  
m a x  m a ~  bt> ~ -- b~_ 1 bt< ~ - bo 
b ' ~ -  ~ - b , _  1 
Unanticipated 
m a x  m a x  bt> ~ - bt bt< ~ - bt 
bma~ I. 
. . . . . .  t < f  - -  u t - I  
• b t ' ~ ?  - b e - 1  
m a x  bt> ~ - b~_ 1 bt> ? - bo 
Anticipated 
Fig. 3.00 > 0. 
at t = 1 only experience the enlargement of the tax base and not the change in 
political weights. Therefore, they partly exploit the increase in the tax base. Due to 
this anticipation effect, the generations at 7 profit only partly from the widening of 
the tax base. 
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Effect o f  an increase in the interest rate. An increase in the interest rate has two 
effects. Firstly, it enlarges the interest burden of  existing debt and makes debt 
creation in the future more costly. Secondly, the interest revenues on savings rise 
which leads to a widening of  the tax base. Clearly, these two effects are opposing. 
The increase in the interest burden necessitates, ceteris paribus, lower debt growth. 
The effect on the tax base makes, (again) ceteris paribus, larger debt levels 
possible. These effects can be derived from Eq. (19). The increased interest burden 
of  existing debt necessitates an increase of  the factor, (1 + 2 ) / (1  + / 3 ) ,  by which 
the scope for pol icy-making changes. The higher costs of  future debt issuance and 
the growth of the tax base are both contained in the effect on b max. From rewriting 
b max as 0 / (1  + 0 ) +  (1 - g ) / ?  it immediately follows that abmax/ar < 0 since 
g < 1. So, the positive tax-base effect of  an increase in r is dominated by the 
negative interest-burden effect. 
An increase in r leads to a jump to a lower level of  debt, either at t = 7 
(unanticipated, the upper part of  Fig. 4) or at t = 1 (anticipated, the lower part of  
Fig. 4) 19. After  t" the erosion of  the scope for pol icy-making is slowed down 
because of  the increased interest burden of  inherited debt, implying less debt to be 
passed on to future generations. 
Effect o f  an increase in government expenditures. The effect of  a change in the 
government expenditures on b max is clearly negative. An increase in g means that 
a larger share of  tax revenues has to be used for financing these expenditures, 
leaving less room for debt repayments. This naturally implies that less debt can be 
accumulated, i.e. b max is lower. The growth rate of  debt is unaffected since the 
political weights and the interest rate remain unchanged. Hence, an increase in g 
leads to a negative jump in debt. When this jump is observed depends on whether 
it is anticipated or unanticipated. An anticipated change in g at time 7 leads to 
jump at t = 1, an unanticipated at t = 7. (Fig. 5). 
Effect o f  a decrease in population growth. The effect of a decrease in population 
growth, i.e. On < 0, comprises two effects: an increase in the political power of  the 
old generation (0h(1 + n) < 0), because of  the increase of  their relative number, 
and an increase in the effective interest rate (02 > 0). The world interest rate r, of  
19 A jump to a lower debt level at t = 1 in anticipation of a future increase of the interest rate may 
seem odd, since consumers do not exhibit altruistic behavior towards future generations. So why should 
they bother? The reason for this is, of course, that, since they are Stackelberg leaders towards future 
generations, they know the behavior of generation ~ in response to the change in the interest rate. This 
causes a reaction of generation ? -  1 to the displayed behavior of generation 7 which in turn causes a 
reaction of generation 7 -  2, etcetera. 
84 L. M e i j d a m  et al. / European  Journa l  o f  Pol i t ical  E c o n o m y  12 (1996)  6 7 - 9 0  
max Lmax b bt< ~ - bt ut> ~ - t 
/ 
b~j  • - b~_ ~ 
bt>~ -~ - bt-1 
. . . . .  b?<~-= - b~_ 1 
b?>? - bo 
Unant ic ipa ted  
max 
bt< i - bt 
/ 
b?j-= - b, 
I / 
I 
/ I  
/ 
bmacc b- max t>i -- t-1 bt> ~ - b o  
max 
bt> i - bt-1 
bT'g-= - b<-i 
Ant ic ipa ted  
Fig. 4. Or < 0. 
course, remains fixed, just as the political influence of  a young individual, k. 
Rewriting Eq. (19) gives 
/rl+O 1] 
b . . . .  bt:[1-1-~]/iT(1-t-n)-I--- ~ (b . . . .  bt_l). 
Therefore, a decrease in n implies that the scope for policy-making is diminished 
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less quickly from one period to another by successive governments. Apparently, 
the effect of an increase in the political power of the elderly is dominated by the 
effect of the increase in the effective interest rate. Hence, ceteris paribus, a smaller 
part of the scope for policy-making is used by the present generation of politicians. 
Assuming g < 1, this effect is reinforced because a decrease in n leads, through 
the increase in the effective interest rate, to a decrease in b max, implying a 
m a x  bt< i - bt r n a ~  bt> i --  bt 
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contraction of the scope for policy-making. Lower population growth lowers the 
tax base and by this b max decreases. 
Fig. 6 gives an illustration of an unanticipated (upper part) and an anticipated 
(lower part) decrease in the population growth rate. The decrease in b max 
necessitates a jump to a lower level of  debt, either at period 1 (anticipated) or at 
period 7 (unanticipated). 
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4.1. Parameter changes and actual debt policy 
87 
Returning to the actual evolution of debt after World War II described in the 
Introduction, it is interesting to check whether this evolution can be explained by 
the model through parameter changes. With respect to the initially declining debt 
levels, according to Proposition 1, this can be the case if 13 is lower than ~. 
Although the effective interest rate was quite low in that period, the discount 
factor may have been so high that 13 was even lower. Indications of this may be 
found in the fact that savings by consumers were relatively high given the low 
interest rate. Moreover, in this same period many funded pension plans were 
initiated, also indicating the relatively high importance the generations of that time 
attached to the future. Starting in the sixties, the post-war baby-boom generation 
started to enter the labor market. In terms of this model this implies a (small) 
increase in n. It might be hypothesized that this generation was more consumption 
minded than the previous one witnessed by the fact that savings did not increase in 
spite of the increase in the interest rate starting in the early seventies. So, a larger 
generation with a lower discount factor entered the labor market. According to the 
model, this might have caused the shift from decreasing to increasing debt levels 
as observed in practice. This growth of debt continued during the eighties leading 
to rather high levels of debt. Recently, in several countries policy measures were 
enacted to mitigate the growth rate of debt. Moreover, as expressed by the 
EMU-norm regarding the required debt ratio for the member states of the EC, 
maximum levels for the debt ratio were fixed. These phenomena can be interpreted 
in the framework of the model. In particular, many EC-countries expect an aging 
of their population. As noted before, such a decrease in population growth should 
lead to a lower maximum level of debt. Moreover, this maximum level should be 
approached at a slower pace. Fig. 7 illustrates this effect of an anticipated decrease 
in population growth. 20 
In this figure, the generation of politicians at time t = 2 expect an aging of the 
population to occur at time t = 3. Moreover, the generation that is young at t = 2 
is relatively large. In the simulation n = 0.3 was taken in the first two periods to 
indicate an increasing population, followed by a period where the dependency 
ratio increases (n = -0 .1  for t = 3) after which the population stabilizes (n = 0). 
If  the length of one period were equal to 25 years, and period 1 would correspond 
with the first 25 years after World War II, this stylized demographic development 
would roughly correspond with the current EC-situation. The population is ex- 
pected to stabilize at a lower level than the current one in the second or third 
decade of the next century, after a once-only increase of the dependency ratio due 
20 In the s imula t ion  the f o l l o w i n g  parameter  va lues  are used:  k = 0.55, g = 0.5, 0 = 0.5, r = 2.1, 
b 0 = 0. 
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Fig. 7. The evolution of debt. 
- • - no change; - × - baby bust; - z~ - baby boom and bust. 
to the re t i rement  o f  the post-war  baby boom.  21 It appears that, in anticipation o f  
the decrease in populat ion growth,  debt jumps  to a lower  level  at t ime t = 2. Af te r  
this, debt gradual ly approaches the new m a x i m u m  level.  Not ice  f rom Fig. 7 that i f  
the populat ion would  stabilize after t = 2 instead after t = 3, the debt  ratio would  
be slightly higher  in these periods. So, the baby boom,  i.e. the increase in the 
dependency  ratio at t = 3 (n  = - 0 . 1 ) ,  hardly has any effect  on the evolut ion  o f  
debt. But  the baby bust, i.e. the permanent  decrease in populat ion growth (n  = 0) 
affects the evolut ion  of  debt to a large degree.  
5. Concluding remarks 
The literature deal ing with 
surveyed in the Introduction,  
strategic decis ion making  on governmen t  debt, 
most ly  uses a two-per iod  model .  If, however ,  
el Notice from Fig. 7 that an increasing debt ratio has been assumed for the whole post-war period. 
In this simulation the factors that contributed to a declining debt ratio during this period are not taken 
into account. 
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infinite-horizon models are developed, only steady-state comparisons are made. In 
this literature, it is concluded that there is a bias towards non-optimal (either too 
large or too low) levels of debt if and only if succeeding governments have 
different preferences. The model of decision making on govemment debt devel- 
oped in this paper takes a different view; it focuses on the possibility of tax 
shifting in the absence of differences in preferences. An overlapping-generations 
model is used. Consumers, both young and old, pay a consumption tax at the same 
rate. Although the time horizon is infinite, the analyses are not restricted to 
steady-state comparisons. Given logarithmic utility functions, explicit solutions for 
the development of the tax rate and the level of debt are derived. A sequence of 
representative governments will gradually increase or decrease debt. In the former 
case, debt converges to a level determined by the maximum taxing capacity. In the 
case of decreasing debt, it may converge to a level determined by some lower 
bound on the tax rate. Under a social planner, debt may take the same route as 
under a representative government. However, even though differences in prefer- 
ences are abstracted, this is by no means necessary. Representative governments 
may choose another time path of debt than a social planner because of the inherent 
tendency of consumers to shift taxes to future generations. 
In this model the time path of debt can be calculated completely. Therefore, it 
is possible to derive how this path will change due to some foreseen or unforeseen 
change in the parameters. Such a change leads to a jump in the level of debt and, 
thus, forcing it to follow another path. This new path may converge towards a 
different maximum level, or may even decrease instead of increase. The following 
comparative-dynamics results are worth pointing out here. Firstly, if savings 
increase due to a lower rate of time preference, this can be concomitant with a 
desired decrease in the level of government debt. An increase in savings, giving a 
higher potential to finance government debt, is at the same time an expression of 
the increased weight that the current young generation places on its future 
consumption. By the same reasoning, an increase in the rate of time preference 
leads to an increase in the level of government debt. Secondly, in this model 
anticipated aging of the population leads to an immediate curtailing of debt. 
Basically, aging limits the possibility to shift the tax burden to the future by debt 
creation as it increases the effective interest rate. A combination of these parame- 
ter changes may lead to a time path of debt that is roughly consistent with the time 
path observed in most western countries after World War II. 
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